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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
or abuse, it should approve the settlement and dismiss the action." The
Fourth Circuit therefore succeeded in limiting the district court's ability
to inhibit precertification settlements by insuring that adequate reasons
exist to notify a putative class of a proposed settlement. Concurrently, the
court enhanced the policy of approval of valid precertification settlements
through a procedural device which avoids the complexities involved in
holding a certification hearing as a prerequisite to dismissal of the suit.s
THOMAS H. JUsTIcE, I
V. CIVIL RIGHTS
A. Disclosure of Investigatory Records
Under the Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act' (FOIA) was enacted to assure public
access to records held by the federal government. 2 The Act restricts the
582 F.2d at 1316.
On remand from the Fourth Circuit, the district court in Shelton criticized the Fourth
Circuit's holding on several grounds. The district court asserted that the Fourth Circuit's
opinion provided little guidance regarding the method by which a trial court should make
findings concerning abuse of the class action device or prejudice to the putative class without
notice that their case is being heard. Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., No. 76-069, slip op. at 3
(W.D.N.C., filed Feb. 12, 1979). The district court reasoned that the Fourth Circuit's restric-
tion on routine notice, see text accompanying notes 29-40 supra, forced the trial court to rely
on the representations of the settling lawyers that the settlement is not prejudicial or collu-
sive. No. 76-069, slip. op. at 4-5. Rather than placing reliance on the settling counsel, the
district court stated that notice of the settlement would allow the trial court to better protect
the claims of the putative class by allowing them to file their own claims. Id. After conducting
a careful hearing, however, the district court found collusion in the unsolicited promise of
Shelton's counsel not to pursue any more claims against Pargo on behalf of the putative class.
Id. at 6. Pargo therefore was ordered to mail notice of the settlement to the putative class.
Id. at 7.
1 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
2 The drafters envisioned the Act as a means of ensuring an informed electorate through
broad public access to executive department records. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2418, 2429. See N.L.R.B. v. Robbins
Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). "Disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant
objective of the Act." Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 362 (1976).
The FOIA contains three basic subsections. The first establishes an affirmative obliga-
tion of each agency to make information available to the public, either by publication or by
making the information available for public inspection upon specific requests. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a) (1976). The second subsection contains exemptions to mandatory disclosure. Id. §
552(b). The third subsection limits exemptions only to that which is "specifically stated" in
the FOIA and provides that information may not be withheld from Congress. Id. § 552(c).
See generally Cox, A Walk Through Section 552 of the Administrative Procedure Act; The
Freedom of Information Act; The Privacy Act; and the Government in the Sunshine Act, 46
U. CINN. L. Rxv. 969 (1978); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm.
L. REv. 761 (1967); see also HousE Comm. ON Gov'T Op., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT AND
AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P. L. 93-502), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 157-58 (Joint Comm. Print 1975)
[hereinafter cited as SoumcEBooK].
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availability of government-held documents, however, by authorizing se-
crecy for sensitive information. 3 For instance, the disclosure provisions of
the FOIA do not apply to government records of law enforcement investiga-
tions if their release would result in one of six enumerated harms or if a
federal statute prohibits release of information to the public.4
Two recent Fourth Circuit cases considered the validity of requests for
information contained in investigatory records held by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and by the FBI. In Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. Perry,5 an employer requested that the
3 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). There are nine categories of exemption from FOIA disclosure.
Id. Congress did not intend requested information falling within an exemption to be prohib-
ited from disclosure, but rather the intention was to allow agencies to withhold information
if they so choose. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 158. Nevertheless, the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Circuits have held that the FOIA does prohibit disclosure through its exemptions. Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1197 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
924 (1977); Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. FPC, 542 F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976); Continental
Oil Co. v. FPC, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1975); cf. Associated
Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 419 F. Supp. 814, 821-22 (E.D. Va. 1976) (FOIA exemptions not
a bar to voluntary disclosure of information). The circuits which confer prohibitory power
upon exemptions have been criticized for being inconsistent with the language and history of
the FOIA. K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
DAvIs].
1 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (7) (1976). Investigatory records are exempt from production to
the extent their disclosure would constitute:
(A) interference with enforcement proceedings; or
(B) deprivation of a person's right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication; or
(C) an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; or
(D) the disclosure of the identity of a confidential source, and in a criminal or
national security intelligence investigation, a disclosure of confidential information
furnished only by the confidential source; or
(E) disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures; or
(F) endangerment of the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
Id. at § 552(b)(7)(A)-(E). Exemption 3 prevents application of the FOIA to items specifically
exempted from disclosure by other federal statutes. Id. at § 552(b) (3). The exempting statute
must establish particular criteria for withholding or refer to particular types of material to
be withheld. Id. It must not allow any federal agency discretion on matters to be withheld.
Id.
Typical of the kind of statute preventing disclosure through exemption 3 are 35 U.S.C.
§ 122 (1976) (applications for patent shall be kept in confidence by the Patent Office) and 50
U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and (g) (1976) (mandating withholding of CIA information by its director).
Exemption 3 would not operate where a statute requiring the Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare to withhold Social Security reports allows him to release reports where he, in
his discretion, prescribes release by regulation. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976).
Exemption 3 was totally revised in a 1976 amendment to the FOIA. The previous text of
that exemption specified that the FOIA did not require disclosure of matters "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute." 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966). The Supreme Court in FAA
Adm'r v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975), held that the term "specific" in exemption 3 could
not be read as meaning the exemption applied only where statutes named documents pre-
cisely or described specifically the category in which they fall. Id. at 265. When Congress
amended exemption 3, the House Report said the exemption does require specificity and that
the amendment was drafted to overrule Robertson. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
22, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2183, 2205.
5 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978).
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EEOC supply copies of complaints of discrimination and supporting affi-
davits filed by its employees.' The Fourth Circuit, relying on FOIA exemp-
tions 3 and 7(A), held that charges and affidavits filed by present employ-
ees were nondisclosable under the act.' Sworn statements of past employ-
ees, however, were ordered released The Fourth Circuit employed exemp-
tion 7(D) in Nix v. United States" when it refused to allow disclosure of
information in FBI investigatory files obtained from confidential sources."
The court also held that exemption 7(C) protected from disclosure infor-
mation that, if released, would invade individual privacy." To determine
the scope of disclosure, the Nix court engaged in a balancing of interests
which, although not authorized by the language of the FOIA itself, is
countenanced by case law.' 3 However, the Fourth Circuit in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg lacked both statutory and case support for its case-by-case
approach to FOIA exemptions and its consideration of the requesting
party's special ability to obtain information outside the FOIA in order to
determine its rights under the act.
In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Au-
thority (Authority) filed an FOIA request with the EEOC to receive sworn
statements of parties charging the Authority with employment discrimina-
tion." The EEOC denied the request, stating that it was statutorily prohib-
ited from releasing the requested information by Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.'1 The Commission first relied on FOIA exemption 3
which provides that where a statute prohibits disclosure, the FOIA will not
apply.'" The EEOC also maintained that production of requested informa-
tion would interfere with its pending employment discrimination proceed-
ings." Under exemption 7(A), potential interference with an enforcement
proceeding is a basis for withholding investigatory records.' 8
After the agency denied the Authority's request, the Authority filed suit
to compel disclosure of the information.'9 The district court ordered the
affidavits of former Authority employees released but upheld the nondis-
closure of present employees' affidavits."0 The court determined that re-
I Id. at 197.
7 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (7)(A) (1976); see note 4 supra.
8 571 F.2d at 202.
O Id.
10 572 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 1004-06.
" Id. at 1005-06.
" See text accompanying notes 74, 78 infra.
" 571 F.2d at 197.
,5 See text accompanying notes 34-40 infra.
" 571 F.2d at 197.
" See note 4 supra; text accompanying notes 41-46 infra.
' See note 4 supra.
" 571 F.2d at 197. A party is entitled to bring an FOIA law suit in federal district court
only after exhausting his administrative remedies. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C) (1976). In addition
to seeking a disclosure order, the Hospital sought unsuccessfully to enjoin the EEOC enforce-
ment proceeding until the requested information was released. 571 F.2d at 197.
20 571 F.2d at 198.
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lease of information supplied by present employees would have a chilling
effect on the willingness of those employees to make further statements to
the EEOC, for fear of reprisals.' Thus, the district court concluded that
interference with an enforcement proceeding was likely and, while failing
to address the exemption 3 issue, held that exemption 7(A) warranted
nondisclosure."2
The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the district court,3 found that exemp-
tion 7(A) was properly invoked 4 and that exemption 3 was inapplicable to
the facts of the case." The Fourth Circuit endorsed the district court's
application of exemption 7(A), including its analysis of the specific content
of the requested records and the potential effect of disclosure." Agreeing
with the lower court, the circuit court refused to find that records were per
se disclosable or nondisclosable solely on the basis of the type of request
made and type of enforcement proceeding involved.? The court thus ex-
plained its rationale for an exemption 7(A) case-by-case analysis. 2
The Fourth Circuit improperly relied on the legislative history to the
1974 FOIA amendment, which added exemption 7(A), to justify the case-
by-case analysis.2 9 The amendment was drafted to overrule cases which
held that all files of investigations were nondisclosable.3 ° However, the
Fourth Circuit viewed that amendment as an absolute bar to all per se
interpretations of exemption 7.31 As a result of the 1974 amendment, files
cannot be withheld simply because they are investigatory, but there seems
to be no prohibition against granting a blanket exemption for certain types
of investigatory files.
At the time of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg decision, a majority of cir-
cuits had rejected the exemption 7(A) case-by-case analysis used by the




2, Id. at 199.
21 Id. The district court's finding, affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, followed an in camera
examination of the requested affidavits. Id. at 202.
26 Id. at 202.
v Id.
Id.
I d. at 201-02.
3 Prior to 1974, a number of courts ruled that if a file was investigatory in nature,
regardless whether it was open or closed, its-contents were nondisclosable. E.g., Center for
Nat'l Pol. Rev. on Race and Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 993 (1974); Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
Congress sought to overrule those broad interpretations of exemption 7 providing that a
specific harm must be found to justify nondisclosure under exemption 7. SoURcEBOOK, supra
note 2, at 333-34; see text accompanying note 33 infra. See also Ellsworth, Amended Exemp-
tion 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 25 AM. U. L. Rxv. 37, 37 (1975); Note, The
Investigatory Files Exemption to the FOIA: The D.C. Circuit Abandons Bristol-Myers, 42
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 869 (1974).
31 571 F.2d at 202.
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type of information requested rather than the specific facts involved."
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, the
Supreme Court settled the conflict between the exemption 7(A) per se
approach and the Fourth Circuit's case-by-case analysis infavor of the per
se rule. In NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 33 the Supreme Court
held that statements by NLRB witnesses could be withheld since disclo-
sure of such statements would, generally, interfere with enforcement pro-
ceedings.34 Consequently, the Robbins per se rule for exemption 7(A)
n NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1977); Harvey's
Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 1976); New England Med. Ctr.
Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 385-86 (1st Cir. 1976); Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539
F.2d 63, 64-65 (10th Cir. 1976); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir.
1976); Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 490-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976). See generally Note, Developments Under the Freedorz of Information Act-1976,
1977 DuKe L.J. 532; Note, The Title Guarantee Theory And Related Decisions: Are The
Courts Interfering With Exemption 7 of the FOIA?, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav. 275 (1977). The
case first establishing the per se rule was Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). Title Guarantee involved a request by a defendant
in an unfair labor practice action for access to statements and affidavits taken during NLRB
investigations. The Second Circuit held that disclosure of information obtained in connection
with an NLRB enforcement proceeding would interfere with enforcement proceedings under
the terms of exemption 7. Id. at 492. The court cited the possible intimidating effects disclo-
sure would have upon employees if information was released to employers. Id. at 491. Rather
than look at the potential for intimidation in the facts of the case before it, the court looked
at NLRB discovery rules reflecting the overall potential for harm disclosure would have in
labor enforcement cases generally. Id. The rule was thereby established requiring nondisclo-
sure of NLRB open investigatory files because disclosure per se would intimidate employees
and interfere with enforcement proceedings.
Although the Title Guarantee decision was expressly limited to files of ongoing NLRB
enforcement proceedings, id. at 492, the per se rule of open file nondisclosure has been applied
in cases not dealing with the NLRB. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 546 F.2d 599 (5th
Cir. 1977) (defendant in a criminal tax prosecution denied use of the FOIA); National Pub.
Radio v. Bell, 431 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1977) (exemption given Department of Justice
investigatory files labeled active). Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir.
1977) is noteworthy because the Fourth Circuit, in dictum, endorsed the per se rule for records
relating to unfair labor practice proceedings. Id at 1136.
= 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
3 Id. at 243. The Supreme Court adopted a generic exemption for all open NLRB investi-
gatory files identical to the per se exemption rule of Title Guarantee. See note 32 supra. The
Court held that since exemption 7(A) was written in the plural voice ("interference with
enforcement proceedings"), generic determinations were contemplated by the drafters of that
exemption. Id. at 234. The court stated that a determination by federal courts that particular
kinds of investigatory records would interfere with particular kinds of enforcement proceed-
ings was appropriate. Id. at 236. Although possibly distinguishable from Charlotte-
Mecklenburg on its facts, Robbins clearly repudiates a case-by-case approach to exemption
7(A).
The concerns with retaliation by an employer against a complaining employee are logi-
cally the same in unfair labor practice cases like Robbins and employment discrimination
cases like Charlotte-Mecklenburg. The Supreme Court did not limit its analysis of exemp-
tion 7(A) to NLRB cases nor did it equivocate in the statement of its holding. Id. at 235-36.
The generic exemption approach was adopted even by the dissenters in Robbins who agreed
with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg conclusion that disclosing current employees' statements
was potentially more harmful than releasing those of former employees. Id. at 252 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
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avoids judicial determination of specific needs, status and potential con-
duct of parties requesting information. That rule is consistent with the
principle underlying the FOIA that all citizens are equally entitled to
government held information. 5 The Fourth Circuit's case-by-case ap-
proach to exemption 7(A) violated that principle of equality.
The Fourth Circuit similarly overlooked the equality principle when it
considered the requesting party's status as a party to an EEOC suit in
applying the facts of Charlotte-Mecklenburg to FOIA exemption 3.38 The
exemption 3 question resolved by the Fourth Circuit was whether Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should prevent operation of the FOIA.37 Title
VII criminalizes public disclosure by the EEOC of information relating to
pending actions.3 Since exemption 3 protects information from FOIA dis-
closure when a statute bars public access, 3 the Title VII prohibition should
trigger exemption 3.10 However, there is case law declaring that informa-
tion requested by a party to an action is not subject to nondisclosure
because of Title VII.1 In fact, the EEOC has recognized the ability of a
33 All members of the public have equal FOIA rights to documents. NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975) (rights of a litigant no greater than an average
member of the public); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Act precludes
consideration of the interests of the party seeking relief); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976) (agencies
shall make records available to "any person"). See also SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 13;
DAvis, supra note 3, at § 5.6; O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DIscLosuRE § 9.07 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as O'RmLLY]. Needs of particular parties do become relevant, however, to
justify a waiver of search fees, to justify an overburdened agency to answer a request out of
turn, to get one's own files or if an invasion of privacy would be unwarranted under exemption
6 and 7(C). CENTER FOR NAT'L SEC. STUDIES, LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION AcT 8-9 (1978).
1, 571 F.2d at 199.
37 Id.
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), 8(e) (1976) (Sections 706(b) and 709(e) of Title VII). Title VII
states that "[c]harges [filed with the EEOC] shall not be made public by the Commission"
and "it shall be unlawful for any officer or employee to make public ... any information
obtained by the Commission ... prior to the institution of any proceeding." Id.
3' See note 4 supra.
11 The legislative history of exemption 3 indicates congressional intent to classify Title
VII as a statute barring FOIA disclosure through exemption 3. H.R. REP. No. 94-880, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2183, 2205.
"1 See, e.g., H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 939 (1973); accord, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 435 F. Supp. 751, 756 (D.D.C. 1977).
The Kessler decision was based on the legislative history of Title VII which demonstrated that
the Act was never intended to apply to immediate parties to an action. 472 F.2d at 1150; see
110 CONG. REC. 12723 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Three recent cases repudiated Kessler
to the extent that it granted a number of parties access to EEOC files. The Seventh Circuit,
the District of Columbia Circuit and the district court for the Eastern District of Virginia
maintained that disclosure of information surrounding discrimination charges would provide
the impetus for private lawsuits which would overlap and interfere with EEOC enforcement
proceedings. See,Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097 (7th Cir. 1978); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Associated Dry Goods Corp. v.
EEOC, 454 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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party to receive information immune from public disclosure under Title
VI.
4 2
The Charlotte-Mecklenburg court held that exemption 3 did not bar
disclosure of the EEOC files requested by the hospital authority. 3 The
court found that the Title VII prohibition relied on by the EEOC was
inapplicable because the Authority as a party to an EEOC action, was not
subject to its provisions." The court found determinative the fact that
Title VII prohibitions against disclosure of EEOC files relevant to current
investigations forbids disclosure to the public generally but not to parties
to an EEOC action. 5 Had a member of the general public made an FOIA
42 The EEOC promulgated regulations implementing Title VII which allowed, but did
not mandate, release of employment discrimination charges and records to a party. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.20 (1977). The current EEOC regulations only state that, as to parties, "special
disclosure rules apply" and that such rules are on file at the EEOC for public inspection. 29
C.F.R. § 1610.17 (1978). Under the regulations in force at the time of the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg case, the EEOC had discretion regarding the release of information to the
charging party, respondent, witnesses or government agencies. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1977).
The Fifth Circuit upheld that discretionary right of release. H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472
F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). See generally Connolly & Fox,
Employer Rights And Access to Documents Under the Freedom of Information Act, 46 FoRD.
L. REv. 203 (1977).
4 571 F.2d at 200-01. Charlotte-Mecklenburg was a case of first impression on the issue
of Title VII, exemption 3 and EEOC disclosure. A number of FOIA exemption 3/Title VII
cases have been litigated, but they have involved requests to reporting committees outside
the EEOC for equal employment opportunity reports filed by employers. The reports are sent
to a non-EEOC reporting committee, rather than directly to EEOC employees. Courts have
found that this places any disclosure outside the coverage of Title VII, which by its terms
applies only to EEOC employees. Exemption 3 therefore does not bar disclosure. Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1199 & n.21 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 924 (1977); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 509 F.2d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Crown
Cent. Petrol. Corp. v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 744, 750-51 (D.Md. 1976); Robertson v. DOD,
402 F. Supp. 1342, 1347-48 (D.D.C. 1975); Legal Aid Soc. v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 775-
76 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
" 571 F.2d at 200; see text accompanying note 38 supra. The EEOC contended that the
Authority could not receive information through the FOIA which the EEOC initially withheld
in its discretion granted by 19 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1977). In effect, the EEOC argued that since
the Authority was not excluded from the prohibitions of Title VII, the Authority was therefore
subject to the effect of Title VII. Brief for Appellants at 23, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp.
Auth. v. Perry, 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978). In dictum the Fourth Circuit noted that if the
Authority had been denied access through an exercise of EEOC discretion, exemption 3 would
not operate as a bar to disclosure since by its terms, statutes allowing discretion do not bar
operation of the FOIA. 571 F.2d at 199.
0 Id. at 200. The court held that to bar access in this case, a statutory prohibition against
disclosure, as required by exemption 3, must be more than simply a prohibiton against
disclosure to the public generally but must cover disclosure to the specific requesting party.
Id. In Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. EEOC, 454 F. Supp. 387 (E.D. Va. 1978), the district
court contended that Charlotte-Mecklenburg did not stand for the principle that parties are
not subject to Title VII, because both the EEOC and the hospital authority stipulated that
principle. Id. at 391-92. The district court found that the Fourth Circuit made no explicit
finding as to the propriety of releasing information to parties since the parties did not contest
the inapplicability of Title VII to the Authority. Id. The Fourth Circuit did, however, refer
to Kessler and EEOC regulations, both of which recognize a party's access to information
despite Title VII prohibitions. 571 F.2d at 199; see text accompanying notes 37-38 supra.
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request for the same information requested by the Authority, it seems clear
that the court would have recognized exemption 3, effectuated by Title
VII, as a bar to FOIA release." The Fourth Circuit stated it would not
consider the Authority's status"7 yet made a determination of the applica-
bility of exemption 3 based on the fact that the Authority was a party to
an EEOC action. Since the Authority, as a party, could have obtained the
same information under Title VII, the court granted FOTA access.48 The
holding was an apparent reaction to the incongruity of Title VII prohibit-
ing disclosure to a party requesting under the FOIA, when by itself Title
VII would permit disclosure to that party.
The court declared that its treatment of exemption 3 was consistent
with two important goals of the FOIA: that requesting parties have a prima
facie right to information since disclosure is the dominant purpose of the
Act;4" and if disclosure is restricted by exemptions, those exemptions are
to be construed narrowly." The court overlooked, however, an equally
important FOIA goal of equal treatment for those requesting information.'
Since Title VII prohibits disclosure to the public through exemption 3,
Title VII should apply universally to prohibit disclosure to any FOIA
requester. The fact that the party suing for information in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg was a defendant in a civil rights action for employment dis-
crimination should have been of no importance in applying a statute that
on its face applies uniformly td all who invoke its provisions.
The Supreme Court's adoption in Robbins2 of the per se exemption rule
for exemption 7(A) cases reflects the view that, absent clear congressional
intent to the contrary, exemptions should be construed without regard to
46 "Title VII ... will not, therefore, defeat the Hospital's 'prima facie right' to disclo-
sure, even though it may prohibit disclosure to some other [FOIA] requesting party." 571
F.2d at 200-01. d
1, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg court remarked that: "[t]he Hospital in this case, has
no greater rights under the Act than any other member of the public ...... Id. at 199.
46 Id. at 199-200.
1' Id. at 200. The concept of a prima facie right to disclosure follows from the principle
that exemptions are to be construed narrowly. Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 617-18 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976). There is a legal presumption in favor of disclosure
and the burden of proof is on federal agencies if they withhold information, to show that
specific exemptions protect information from disclosure. See note 2 supra. See also
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 10; O'REILLY, supra note 35, at § 9.01.
11 571 F.2d at 200. The FOIA contains a provision declaring that exemptions are limited
to materials specifically stated. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (c) (1976). Exemption from disclosure depends
entirely on statutory language. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976).
Therefore, FOIA exemptions have been construed very narrowly to ensure the fullest public
access. Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (strict construction implicit in
FOIA clause which allows exemptions only for that which is "specifically stated" in the act);
Stretch v. Weinberger, 495 F.2d 639, 641 (3d Cir. 1974) (disclosure sections to be read broadly,
exemptions narrowly); Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 427, 429 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974) ("specifically stated" clause italicized for emphasis); see DAvis,
supra note 3, at § 5.28; O'REILLY, supra note 35, at § 9.01.
51 See text accompanying note 35 supra.
52 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
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the particular facts underlying requests for information."3 The Charlotte-
Mecklenburg treatment of exemption 3 requires an inquiry into the status
of requesting parties and an evaluation of their coverage under federal
exempting statutes. In addition to violating the equality principle, the
Fourth Circuit's approach would burden an already overtaxed bureaucracy
handling FOIA requests.54 Moreover, that approach seems contrary to the
philosophy expressed in Robbins.
Subjective analysis of underlying facts, however, is sometimes possible
under the FOIA. A balancing of interests, which weighs the public's need
for information and the government's need for secrecy, and an inquiry into
promises of confidentiality given informers are clearly allowed under cer-
tain sections of the Act, as evidenced by the legislative history and case
interpretation of the Act.5 Such a subjective analysis was properly exer-
cised by the Fourth Circuit in Nix v. United States."5
In Nix, the purported beating of a prisoner by guards resulted in an FBI
criminal investigation into possible civil rights violations.57 The FOIA re-
quest of the prisoner, Nix, to obtain the report of the FBI investigation
from the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice was denied.5
Nix then brought a FOIA suit to force disclosure by the Justice Depart-
ment." The district court dismissed Nix's complaint and was affirmed by
Id. at 236.
See SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2, at 15-17. The costs in money and time imposed on the
FBI by Freedom of Information requests are similar to those felt by many federal agencies.
In 1977, acording to a General Accounting Office report, the FBI spent $13.8 million in
complying with the FOIA. GAO Report No. LCD-78-119, June 16, 1978. The Justice Depart-
ment, within which the FBI operates, reported 14,437 FOIA requests in 1977, of which 13,528
were processed. 4 AccEss REPORTS (No. 2) 21 March 1978.
See text accompanying notes 74-80 infra.
U 572 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1978).
'T Id. at 1000-01.
Id. The prisoner presumably sought the FBI reports in anticipation of litigation, in
order to discover the names of the officials who allegedly beat him. The Fourth Circuit noted
that the FOIA was not designed to supplement standard discovery procedures, but added that
Nix's right to obtain information was neither enhanced nor diminished because of his needs
as a litigant. Id. at 1003; see NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 (1975)
(status as a litigant does not affect FOIA rights); DAvIs, supra note 3, at § 5.7. For a discussion
of the policies behind the FOIA and discovery, see Project, Government Information and the
Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971, 1150 (1975).
" 572 F.2d at 1001. After commencement of the FOIA suit, Nix received a small portion
of the materials he requested from the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department. The
information Nix did receive was altered through deletion of administrative markings'such as
file numbers, routing stamps and cover letters. Id. at 1001. The deletions were made pursuant
to FOIA exemption 2, the agency internal practices exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1977).
Exemption 2 allows nondisclosure of materials related solely to the internal personnel rules
and practices of an agency. Id. The Fourth Circuit found the deletions proper. 572 F.2d at
1005. That determination comports with the current interpretation of exemption 2. See De-
partment of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1976) (exemption 2 applies to matters
of internal significance in which the public could not possibly have an interest); Maroscia v.
Levi, 569 F.2d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1977) (FBI properly deleted file numbers, initials, signa-
tures and mail routing stamps from information given a requesting party).
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the Fourth Circuit. 0 The Nix court reasoned that exemption 7(D), which
protects confidential sources and the information they provide in criminal
investigations,' justified withholding reports produced from letters re-
ceived by the FBI and FBI interviewers. 2 Reviewing the facts, the appel-
late court determined that the sources of information, as well as the re-
ports compiled from their letters and interviews, were intended to be con-
fidential. 3 The court declared that implied assurances of confidentiality
were given to the individuals interviewed by the FBI during its investi-
gation. 4 Thus, the court determined that confidentiality need not be
expressly agreed upon between informers and investigators but may be
implied from the circumstances of the investigation. 5 The court's finding
of implied confidentiality, sufficient to justify nondisclosure of the reports
under exemption 7(D), stemmed from the court's examination of FOIA
law at the time the FBI interviews were conducted and letters were re-
ceived." The FBI reports were composed of information gathered prior
60 572 F.2d at 1001. The Fourth Circuit ordered the release of Nix's own medical report,
contained in the FBI report, as well as information deleted from a report released with the
consent of Nix's fellow inmate. Id. at 1001-02.
66 See note 4 supra.
62 572 F.2d at 1004. The court also found that reports from non-federal law enforcement
sources contained in the FBI report on the alleged beating were free from FOIA disclosure on
the basis of exemption 7(D). Id. at 1005. The court found that release of the information
provided by other law enforcement agencies would inhibit the FBI's relationship with non-
federal law enforcement personnel. Id. The court relied on Church of Scientology v. United
States Dep't of Just., 410 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal. 1976), to find that the materials provided
by the non-FBI law enforcement officials were supplied in confidence and thus subject to
exemption 7(D). 572 F.2d at 1005. In Church of Scientology, a California district court
examined the legislative history of the FOIA and found no legal support for the proposition
that information supplied by law enforcement agencies was less important to law enforcement
than information provided by ordinary citizens. 410 F. Supp. at 1303. The court concluded
that if confidentiality was assured to a source, whether an individual or a law enforcement
agency, information subsequently provided by that source should not be released. Id. Thus,
information provided by a law enforcement agency under an assurance of confidentiality,
implied from the importance of the agency-FBI relationship, was protected by exemption
7(D). Id. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the legislative history of exemption 7(D) spoke
of sources in terms of human beings rather than organizations, but it found that the underly-
ing rationale of exemption 7(D) supported the concept of confidentiality for non-federal law
enforcement agencies and the information they provide. 572 F.2d at 1004.
63 572 F.2d at 1004; see Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir.
1977) (confidentiality a question of fact).
66 572 F.2d at 1004.
,1 Id. at 1003. The legislative history behind exemption 7(D) suggested that confidential-
ity may arise from express assurances or in circumstances from which such assurances can
reasonably be inferred. See S. CONF. REP. No. 93-1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6267, 6291.
Some courts disfavor implied promises of confidentiality and require a higher standard
of proof. See, e.g., Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 489 n.11 (2d Cir. 1976)
(criticizing implied assurances of confidentiality given NLRB witnesses); accord, Local 30
v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 520, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (implied assurances invalid basis for finding
confidentiality). See also O'REILLY, supra note 35, at § 17.10.
66 572 F.2d at 1003-04.
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to the 1974 amendment of the exemption. 7 The Nix court observed
that prior to the 1974 amendment, all investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes were exempt from FOIA disclosure." Therefore,
the court concluded, there was reason for the FBI sources to believe that
the information they provided would be confidential and not be subject
to FOIA disclosure.6 9
The court found further support for its finding of implied confidential-
ity in the hostile prison environment in which the FBI investigation took
place." Both prisoners and guards involved in the altercation leading to
Nix's alleged beating were sources for the FBI report.71 The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the fear of retribution or retaliation would have silenced the
sources of information unless they believed the FBI report would be confi-
dential.12 Thus, the court determined that the environment in which the
information was gathered also strongly suggested an expectancy of confi-
dentiality.
The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the denial of Nix's FOIA request to
obtain the names of the FBI agents and assistant U.S. attorney involved
in the investigation into Nix's alleged beating.71 The court held that non-
disclosure of the names was justified on the basis of exemption 7(C),11
which sanctions nondisclosure of investigatory records where interests of
personal privacy would be violated unnecessarily.7 5 The court noted that
FBI agents generally have only a minimal privacy interest,7 yet in this case
17 Id. at 1003; see note 4 supra.
Is 572 F.2d at 1003. Exemption 7 previously allowed non-disclosure of law enforcement
investigatory records unless a statute specifically allowed disclosure. 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967).
This is in marked contrast to the present codification of exemption 7 which requires a finding
of specific harm enumerated in one of the exemption's subsections to justify nondisclosure.
See note 4 supra.
" 572 F.2d at 1004. It is surprising that the court would justify a belief that all investiga-
tory files were exempt under the previous codification of exemption 7. The Fourth Circuit
did not find that the pre-amendment exemption 7 precluded disclosure of information in
investigatory files in every instance. See, e.g., Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. I.T.O. Corp.,
508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). The court's
analysis, however, may simply be a recognition that the prevailing state of the law when the
interviews were conducted held all investigatory files exempt. See Note, The Freedom Of
Information Act-A Potential Alternative To Conventional Criminal Discovery, 14 Am. Crm.
L. REv. 73, 112 (1976).
7' 572 F.2d at 1004.
71 Id.
" Id. The recent testimony of a convict before a Senate sub-committee demonstrated
that fear of retribution following FOIA release of law enforcement investigatory information
is well founded. 4 AccEss REPORTS (No. 111) 5 September 1978. The convict reported that he
had filed 100 FOIA requests for himself and other inmates. Often, he would file the same
requests several times. Each time deletions in the information he received would be somewhat
different. By piecing together the documents, he could learn the names of informers. In at
least one case, the convict said, a confidential informant was identified and possibly mur-
dered as a result of a report received from the Drug Enforcement Administration. Id.
7 572 F.2d at 1005-06.
11 Id. at 1006.
¢' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1976); see note 4 supra.
7' 572 F.2d at 1006. For a general discussion of the privacy interests of government
employees, see REPoRTERs CoMmrrrEE FOR FREEDoM OF THE PREss, PRIVAcY AND PuBuc Discmo-
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the privacy of those individuals to be named outweighed the public inter-
est in learning the names of the agents. 7 The court made that determina-
tion by balancing the public and private interests. 8 The balancing was not
supported by the text of the FOIA itself,79 but was clearly justified under
case law."'
The Supreme Court has declared the need for a balancing of potentially
conflicting interests where there are questions of "clearly unwarranted
invasions" of personal privacy under FOIA exemption 6.81 Both exemp-
tions 6 and 7(C) bar FOIA disclosure where there might be an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy. 2 Exemption 6 applies to medical and person-
nel files, while exemption 7(C) deals with investigatory files." Both exemp-
tions are designed to protect personal privacy. The similarity of purpose
behind the exemptions provides the basis for employing a balancing of
interests analysis in exemption 7(C) cases. Although the Fourth Circuit
in an earlier decision became the first circuit to establish a balance of
SURE UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr 31 (1976).
71 572 F.2d at 1006. The court was concerned that public identification of the federal
employees could have conceivably resulted in their harassment or could have interfered with
their official duties and private lives. Id. It also found the public interest in disclosure
insufficient to override the privacy interest in nondisclosure. Id. But see Ferguson v. Kelley,
448 F. Supp. 919, 923 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (FBI agents have no privacy interest in the release of
their identities). The Fourth Circuit's opinion noted that the potential harassment or interfer-
ence was not severe enough to justify reliance on exemption 7(F), which shields information
in investigatory files which, if released, would endanger the life or physical safety of law
enforcement personnel. 572 F.2d at 1006 n.8, citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (1976).
7' 572 F.2d at 1006.
7' Disclosure under the FOIA must be made to any person regardless of his interest. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976). The language of the act's disclosure provisions does not explicitly
authorize balancing of interests. Id.; see DAvis, supra note 3, at § 5.6.
0 Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 373 (1976); Deering Milliken, Inc.
v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1136 (4th Cir. 1977); Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 171 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Rural Housing Alliance v. Department of Agri., 498 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Congressional News Synd. v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 542 (D.D.C. 1977). See generally Note, Invasion Of Privacy
And The Freedom Of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 527 (1972).
81 Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). Plaintiffs in Rose, law review
editors, sought access to files containing summaries of actions by Air Force Academy discipli-
nary boards in connection with trials for honor code violations. Id. at 355. The Supreme Court
relied on the legislative history of FOIA exemption 6 to articulate the need for a balancing of
interests test. Id. at 372. Under the balancing test adopted in Rose, the public interest in Air
Force Academy discipline exceeded privacy rights of former cadets and disclosure was al-
lowed. Id. at 381. See also H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in [1966]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2428.
82 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C) (1976). To prevent FOIA disclosure, exemption 6 requires
a potential invasion of privacy to be clearly uwarranted, rather than simply unwarranted, the
standard of exemption 7(C). The "clearly" requirement makes nondisclosure harder to justify
under exemption 6. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378-79 & n.16; O'RELLY,
supra note 35, at § 17.09.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), 7(C). Exemption 6 was included in the original enactment of the
FOIA in 1966 while exemption 7(C) resulted from the 1974 amendment of the investigatory
files exemption. O'REILLY, supra note 35, at §§ 16.02, 17.09.
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interests approach to exemption 7(C) cases, 4 the balancing approach is
now well settled."
Nix's FOIA suit to receive investigatory files failed when he was denied
the names of federal officers involved in the investigation of his alleged
beating and denied the reports the officers produced. Yet in Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, the court ordered the release of the requested information. 7
Despite difference in outcome, both Nix and Charlotte-Mecklenburg re-
veal the Fourth Circuit's preference for subjective analysis of underlying
facts in applying FOIA exemptions 3, 7(A), 7(C) and 7(D) to requests for
investigatory files. The status of informers and requesting parties, the
express or implied promises of confidentiality given informers, and the
public and governmental interests in disclosure are all factors the Fourth
Circuit considered important. These two Fourth Circuit cases are consis-
tent with each other, yet only the court's subjective analysis in connection
with exemption 7(C) and 7(D) in Nix is supported by case law. By contrast,
the Supreme Court in Robbins rejected the case-by-case approach to ex-
emption 7(A), thereby impliedly overruling the subjective analysis of the
Fourth Circuit in Charlotte-Mecklenburg."5 There was also an absence of
any statutory or judicial support for the Fourth Circuit's treatment of
exemption 3, which violated the equality principle. The status of a request-
ing party cannot prevent the uniform application of exemption 3 when an
agency processes a Freedom of Information Act request. 9
CHRISTOPHER WOLF
B. Employment Discrimination
Claims of job discrimination can be brought under both Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Title VII) and the equal protection clause of the
84 Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1136 & n.7 (4th Cir. 1977). The balanc-
ing of interests in Deering Milliken resulted in the Fourth Circuit allowing disclosure of
workers' private financial records in NLRB investigatory files to a corporation involved in a
suit for back pay. 548 F.2d at 1136. The court found that the interest law students and labor
lawyers had in the release of the records was more important than the protection of the
workers' privacy through exemption 7(C) nondisclosure. Id.
13 Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 778 (D.R.I. 1978); Congressional News
Synd. v. Department of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 542 (D.D.C. 1977). Providence Journal and
Congressional News Syndicate both employ a balancing of interests test and are noteworthy
for elaborate discussions of privacy interests and the FOIAI
" 572 F.2d at 1001.
" 571 F.2d at 198.
" See text accompanying note 34 supra.
" See text accompanying note 35 supra.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Under section 2000e-2(a), it is unlawful for an
employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
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fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.2 While either
may serve as the basis of an individual's claim of discrimination, suits
brought under Title VII and the fourteenth amendment differ both sub-
stantively and procedurally.3 An allegation of job discrimination under the
equal protection clause must be supported by proof that the employer had
an intent to discriminate.4 In a proceeding under Title VII, however, intent
need not be shown.5 Discrimination, whether intentional or not, is illegal.,
A claim based on the fourteenth amendment may be filed in federal court
as soon as the discrimination occurs. Under Title VII, however, a charge
must be filed with and investigated by the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission (EEOC or Commission) before any other legal action may
be taken.7 If, upon investigation, the Commission finds that there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred, it must attempt
to settle the case out of court.' Only when these conciliation efforts fail may
the individual or the Commission bring suit.'
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2(a).
2 The equal protection clause reads in relevant part: "No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1. The fourteenth amendment was generally used in actions against state agencies until 1972,
when Title VII was amended to extend the coverage of the act to the states. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(a) (1976).
3 See text accompanying notes 4-9 infra. See generally Peck, Remedies for Racial Dis-
crimination in Employment: A Comparative Evaluation of Forums, 46 WASH. L. Rsv. 455
(1971); Comment, Title VII & 42 U.S. C. § 1981; Two Independent Solutions, 10 U. RIcH. L.
REv. 339 (1976).
4 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
5 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); see A. IARSON, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION § 72.20 (1977) [hereinafter cited as LARSON]; text accompanying note 89
infra.
6 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). The complainant must file a charge with the Commission
within 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. at §
2000e-5(e). Charges must be in writing and made under oath. Id. at § 2000e-5(b). The Com-
mission then investigates the charge. Id. If the Commission finds that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the charge of discrimination is true, it must attempt to settle the case
with the employer and stop the unlawful practice. Id. Only when these efforts fail may the
individual or the Commission bring suit. Id. at § 2000e-5(f)(1); see text accompanying notes
8-9 infra.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.22 (1977) (establishing guidelines
to be followed by the EEOC during conciliation efforts).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). When the employer charged is a government, govern-
ment agency, or political subdivision, the EEOC must refer the case to the Attorney General,
who may bring suit. Id. In bringing suit, the EEOC is not limited by the initial charge filed
with it, according to a recent Fourth circuit case. EEOC v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 577 F.2d
229 (4th Cir. 1978). In Chesapeake the original charged filed with the Commission alleged
racial discrimination among employees covered by a union agreement. Id. at 231. The reason-
able cause determination issued by the Commission dealt with both racial and sex discrimi-
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In recent decisions, the Fourth Circuit has discussed and defined many
elements of Title VII. The net effect of these decisions is to make it easier
for a plaintiff to successfully press a job discrimination claim. The court
held in EEOC v. American National Bank0 that laches" would not bar a
suit by the EEOC, although a delay by the Commission in bringing suit1
2
could lead to a limitation of the relief granted if the Commission prevails."
In another case, Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' International Union,4 the
Fourth Circuit concluded that an employer has neither the duty to balance
its work force racially 5 nor to inform job applicants that it does not dis-
criminate. The Fourth Circuit, in Walston v. School Board of Suffolk,,
limited the use of a standardized test as a basis for employment."8 Walston
nation among employees covered by and outside of the union agreement. Id.; see note 7 supra.
The district court had granted a partial summary judgment for the defendant, ruling that
some of the allegations made by the EEOC were not the outgrowth of a reasonable investiga-
tion of the initial charge. 577 F.2d at 231. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that as long
as the new allegations are included in the reasonable cause determination sent to the em-
ployer and are subject to conciliation, a suit by the EEOC need not be limited by the initial
charge filed with the Commission. Id. at 232.-Thus, the EEOC has wide latitude to investigate
and bring suit against an employer once it receives a charge of discrimination.
It 574 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 213 (1978); see text accompanying notes
20-59 infra.
" Laches is an equitable doctrine stating that when there is an unreasonable delay by
the plaintiff in bringing suit and the delay prejudices the defendant, the suit will be barred.
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); Russel v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940);
Mogavero v. McLucas, 543 F.2d 1081, 1083 (4th Cir. 1976). Since laches is a "creature of
equity," each case must be decided on its own facts. Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-continent
Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 1960).
12 574 F.2d at 1174. American Nat'7 Bank deals only with delay by the EEOC in bringing
suit. A private plaintiff must bring suit within 90 days after the Commission has issued a
right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976). A claimant has the right to sue when the
EEOC has finished investigating the charge, whether or not the charge is found to have merit.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b(c) (1977); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1976) (empowering the EEOC to
issue regulations). Also, the claimant may demand that the Commission terminate its investi-
gation and issue a right to sue letter if the Commission has had 180 days to investigate the
charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b(c) (1977); see text accompanying note 7 supra.
11 574 F.2d at 1176. In a Title VII case, a court may enjoin the unlawful practice, order
the reinstatement or hiring of employees, award back pay, and grant any other equitable relief
it finds appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). The granting of relief is within the discre-
tion of the trial judge. Id.,
14 577 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 871 (1979); see, text accompanying
notes 66-102 infra.
Is 577 F.2d at 1141-42. The Lewis court relied on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), which
provides in part:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of
the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed
by an employer. . ..
Is 577 F.2d at 1143.
17 566 F.2d 1201 (4th cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 103-33 infra.
Is 566 F.2d at 1203-04; see text accompanying notes 103-17 infra.
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also set guidelines for awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in
discrimination cases.' 9
Laches as Defense to Title VII Action
In EEOC v. American National Bank,20 the Commission alleged that
the bank had engaged in a pattern of racial discrimination since May 1969
in violation of Title VII.2 ' The initial charge of discrimination was filed
with the EEOC in June 1969 by a black woman who claimed she had been
denied a job because of her race." The Commission investigated the charge
and in March 1974, decided that there was reasonable cause to believe that
the bank had discriminated. 23 In August 1974, after the EEOC had failed
to settle the case with the employer, the complainant was issued a right
to sue letter,2 but she chose not to proceed. 25 In January 1976, almost six
and three-quarter years after the original charge was filed, the Commission
filed suit. 6
The district court granted the bank's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the suit was barred because of the six and three-quarter year
delay by the Commission in bringing the action.? The court reasoned that
while there was no statutory requirement that the EEOC initiate suit
within certain time limits, 8 the Commission could not conduct investiga-
tions of indefinite duration or postpone the initiation of suit for an unlim-
ited time after the failure of conciliation.2 9 Reasonably prompt action by
the Commission, the court stated, is necessary both to serve the policy of
ending discrimination and to ensure fundamental fairness to the defen-
dant.'" The district court, therefore, held that an affirmative defense "in
the nature of laches" should be available to the defendant in an action
brought by the EEOC. 1 Noting that the elements of a laches defense are
" 566 F.2d at 1204-05; see text accompanying notes 118-33 infra.
574 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1978).
21 Id. at 1174; see text accompanying note 1 supra.
2 574 F.2d at 1174.
2 Id.; see text accompanying notes 7-9 supra. In its reasonable cause determination, the
Commission found that most of the bank's black employees held menial jobs, that the percen-
tage of whites employed as tellers greatly exceeded the percentage of whites in the com-
munity, that the bank had used an employment test which had a disproportionate impact
on blacks, see text accompanying notes 85-89 infra, and that the bank, without showing
business necessity, see text accompanying notes 89-91 infra, used credit status as an employ-
ment criteria even though it had a disproportionate impact on blacks. 574 F.2d at 1174-75.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1976); text accompanying note 12 supra.
574 F.2d at 1175; see notes 7-12 supra.
26 574 F.2d at 1175; see note 9 supra.
1 EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1976).
21 Id. at 185-86. The district court held that the EEOC should not be bound by a statute
of limitations and also that there was nothing in Title VII itself which set a time limit within
which the EEOC had to bring suit. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
420 F. Supp. at 186.
Id. at 184-85.
31 420 F. Supp. at 185. The district court used the term "in the nature of laches" to refer
to both laches itself and to section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.
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unreasonable delay in bringing suit and resulting prejudice to the defen-
dant, the district court found both elements existed in the case.12 The only
justification for the delay offered by the EEOC was its heavy workload, a
justification the court found insufficient." The court also stated that the
memories of potential witnesses had dimmed and evidence had been lost
during the delay in bringing suit, thus prejudicing the defendant. 4 There-
fore, the district court found that the elements of the laches defense were
present and the suit was dismissed.?
The Commission appealed the dismissal to the Fourth Circuit.3 1 While
the appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided
Occidental Life Insurance Company v. EEOC.3 In Occidental, the Court
held that Title VII actions brought by the EEOC are not subject to statu-
tory time limitations stemming either from Title VII or from state statutes
of limitation.? The Court found nothing in Title VII itself which set a time
limit within which the Commission must bring suit. 9 The Occidental
§ 706 (1976), and held that the suit could be barred through the application of either one.
420 F. Supl,. at 185; see note 11 supra. Section 706 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), reads
in part: "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
* * * (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed. . . ." When this
section has been used as an alternative to laches, the same elements of unreasonable delay
by the plaintiff coupled with prejudice to the defendant necessary for laches, see note 11
supra, have been held necessary for this defense. See EEOC v. Exchange Sec. Bank, 529 F.2d
1214, 1216 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 792 (N.D. Tex.
1976); EEOC v. Metropolitan Areas Girls' Club, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (N.D. Ga.
1976); EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1976). For cases under
Title VII applying laches, see EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 788-90 (N.D.
Tex. 1976); EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F. Supp. 229, 237 (D. Conn. 1976); EEOC v.
J.C. Penney Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. 641, 642 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
The use of the APA as a substitute for laches has been criticized on several grounds. The
Act was intended to apply to reviews of agency actions and not to trials de novo. See Note,
Time Limitations on the Filing of Title WI Suits by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 215, 235 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Time
Limitations]. The APA also was meant to compel agency action when delay was present, not
to bar it. Id. at 236.
u 420 F. Supp. at 186-88; see note 11 supra; text accompanying note 34 infra.
" 420 F. Supp. at 186. In 1977, the EEOC had a backlog of 130,000 cases. [1977] 2 EMPL.
PRAc. GuIDE (CCH) 5034 (app. B).
31 420 F. Supp. at 187. The original claimant in the action could no longer remember
filing an application for employment with the bank. Id.
" Id. at 188.
U EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 574 F.2d 1173, 1174 (4th Cir. 1978).
432 U.S. 355 (1977). In Occidental, the EEOC was first notified of the alleged discrimi-
nation in December 1970, and the claim was referred to a state equal employment opportunity
agency. Id. at 357. The official charge was filed with the EEOC in March 1971. Id. Concilia-
tion efforts were started by the Commission in the summer of 1972 and were terminated in
September 1973. Id. at 357-58. Suit was filed by the Commission in February 1974, three years
and two months after the claimant first contacted the EEOC. Id. at 358.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 360-61. The defendant had argued that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976) estab-
lished a time limit within which the EEOC had to bring suit. This section states that after
the Commission has had 180 days to investigate the charge, if it has not acted the individual
may bring suit. See note 12 supra. The Court held that this section was designed to allow
19791
448 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Court also reasoned that state law could not be allowed to interfere with
the implementation of national policies." In so holding, the Court pointed
out that Title VII included procedural safeguards, in the form of notices
to the defendant, to protect the defendant from being prejudiced by any
delay in bringing suit."
The Fourth Circuit, applying Occidental's holding, vacated the district
court's order of dismissal.2 The circuit court said that a delay in bringing
suit is no bar to an EEOC action, but that the relief granted to the plaintiff
can be limited if prejudice to the defendant is found to exist. 3 Any deter-
mination of prejudice, the court said, should be made only after the facts
are fully developed and if the Commission prevails in the suit.4 American
National Bank thus interpreted Occidental as excluding laches as a de-
fense to actions brought by the EEOC. Therefore, the defendant's only
remedy for prejudicial delay by the Commission is the limitation of the
relief granted to the Commission. There is nothing, however, in the Su-
preme Court's Occidental decision that would invalidate the application
of laches.
It does not follow that if a statute of limitations is inapplicable laches
also cannot be used, since the two defenses are, by their nature, different.' 5
A statute of limitations bars delayed actions without considering whether
the delay was reasonable or whether it prejudiced the defendant.46 A fixed
time limitation could interfere substantially with the Commission's en-
forcement of Title VII, given the administrative backlog of the EEOC.47
Laches, however, as an equitable concept, is flexible. 8 A finding of laches
results from proof of unreasonable delay coupled with prejudice to the
defendant.49 Thus, laches must necessarily be applied on a case by case
the Commission to have a minimum of 180 days to act before the claimant could file suit,
but not to require the Commission to act within 180 days. 432 U.S. at 361.
40 432 U.S. at 367.
4 Id. at 371-72. The "procedural safeguards" referred to by the Supreme Court are the
notices that are required to be sent to the employer when a claim is failed with the EEOC,
when the Commission has made a determination of reasonable cause, and when the Commis-
sion decides that conciliation efforts have failed. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1601.19(b) (1977). Once a charge has been filed with the Commission, and the employer
notified, the employer must keep all relevant personnel records until final disposition of the
action. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1977). While these safeguards protect against the loss of business
records, they can do nothing to protect against the dimming of the memories of potential
witnesses.
*' 574 F.2d at 1174.
4 Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1175-76.
Laches is an equitable doctrine, while a statute of limitations is a legal defense granted
by statute. See note 11 supra.
" To prove that a statute of limitations is applicable, all that need be shown is that the
required amount of time has passed before the filing of the suit.
" See note 33 supra.
Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 801 (10th Cir.
1960).
"' See note 11 supra.
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basis 0 and does not have the broad application of a statute of limitations.5'
The barring of a particular suit because of delay and prejudice to the
defendant would not frustrate the national policy of ending discrimination.
In stating that the remedy left to the defendant in cases of delay will
be a limitation of the relief granted to the plaintiff, the Fourth Circuit
apparently misinterpreted the Occidental opinion. The Supreme Court in
Occidental referred to a Title VII case where backpay relief was denied to
the private plaintiffs because of their delay in adding a backpay claim to
their action.52 The Occidental Court used this case as an example of the
type of action a court can take when a defendant is prejudiced by delay. 3
The Fourth Circuit, however, read Occidental as saying that the only
power a court will have in the case of unreasonable delay is to limit the
relief given to the plaintiff.4
American National Bank gives the EEOC a free hand in delaying its
enforcement actions." Once a charge is filed and reasonable cause is found,
an employer can never know when, or if, a suit will be brought. Delay in
bringing suit will lessen the pressure on the Commission to relieve its
backlog,56 and will put additional pressure on the employer to settle the
case rather than face the threat of a lawsuit at some indefinite time in the
future. Moreover, when suit is filed, the defendant must withstand a full
trial and be found in violation of Title VII before he will be able to raise a
10 Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 801 (10th Cir.
1960).
' Time Limitations, supra note 31, at 236-37.
52 The Occidental Court referred to Albemdrle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975),
when discussing the defendant's remedy. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355,
373 (1977). In Albemarle, the plaintiffs added a claim for backpay relief five years after the
suit was filed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court was correct in denying the backpay
since the awarding of relief to the plaintiff was left to the discretion of the trial judge. 422
U.S. at 424; see note 13 supra; note 53 infra.
0 The Occidental Court stated:
[A] defendant in a Title VII enforcement action might still be significantly handi-
capped in making his defense because of an inordinate EEOC delay in filing the
action after exhausting its conciliation efforts. If such cases arise the federal courts
do not lack the power to provide relief. This court has said that when a Title VII
defendant is in fact prejudiced by a private plaintiff's unexcused conduct of a
particular case, the trial court may restrict or even deny backpay relief. Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-425. The same discretionary power "to locate
'a just result' in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case," ibid., can also be
exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff.
432 U.S. at 373.
- 574 F.2d 1173, 1175 (4th Cir. 1978).
0 The Fourth Circuit has applied American Natl Bank in EEOC v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 577 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1978). See note 9 supra. The Fourth Circuit in Chesapeake reversed
the district court, which had allowed a defense of laches. The Fourth Circuit held that if the
defendant had been prejudiced, the relief given to the plaintiff could be limited, but that any
finding of prejudice should take place after the trial. 577 F.2d at 234.
" The Commission has been making an attempt to eliminate its backlog by establishing
new procedures for the handling of complaints. See [1977] 2 EMPL. PEAc. GUIDE (CCH)
5034 (app. B).
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claim of prejudice.57 The fact that the defendant has been prejudiced will
not be taken into account in determining whether he will be tried for the
alleged violation. Under the laches defense, as demonstrated by the dis-
trict court in American National Bank,5" a claim of prejudice should be
decided before the trial so that if unreasonable delay has prejudiced the
defendant, he will not be subjected to a trial and to a possible finding that
he has discriminated.
5 9
Racial and Sexual Discrimination Under Title VII
Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' International Union0 is one recent case that
will not aid plaintiffs in future employment discrimination actions. In
Lewis, a class action"1 under Title VII was initiated on behalf of all female
and black male employees of Philip Morris, Inc., who had worked in one
division of the company's factory, the stemmery,2 at any time after July
1965.3 The suit alleged that the company discriminated because members
of the class were hired into the stemmery, which consisted of seasonal
work, in disproportionate numbers, rather than being given permanent
and better paying positions in other departments." The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's finding of racial discrimination by the com-
pany.65
The district court held that Philip Morris had no intent to discriminate
against blacks." In a Title VII action, however, it is not necessary to show
that intent to discriminate exists in order to find a violation of the Act."
Using statistical data, 8 the district court found that the plaintiffs had
made a prima facie case that the hiring procedures of the company had a
17 See text accompanying note 43 supra; note 54 supra.
" EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1976).
" An employer can be damaged not only by the expense of having to go to trial, but also
by being found liable, even if no relief is given to the plaintiff. The employer's reputation
may be damaged by a finding that he has discriminated.
577 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1978).
The majority of employment discrimination suits brought by private plaintiffs are
initiated as class actions. See LARSON, supra note 5, at § 49.50.
u There were four departments at the Philip Morris plant. 577 F.2d at 1137. The stem-
mery, where the current tobacco crop is processed, provides seasonal work and is the depart-
ment with the lowest status in terms of working conditions and pay. Id. The other three
departments, the fabrication, prefabrication, and warehouse departments, provide perma-
nent employment. Id.
Id. at 1137 n.1.
" Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1138.
Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 356 (E.D. Va. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra text accompanying note 89 infra.
" Statistics can play an important role in proving a prima facie case of discrimination.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); see LARSON, supra
note 5, at § 50.30-.32. For example, in Teamsters the plaintiffs used statistics in three ways.
They showed that only a small percentage of the high paying jobs were held by minorities.
431 U.S. at 337-38. The plaintiffs also used statistics to show that most of the minority
employees had low paying jobs. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs compared the percentage of minor-
ity employees to the percentage of minorities in the workforce. Id. at 337 n.17.
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disproportionate impact on blacks. 9 Since Philip Morris did not refute the
plaintiffs prima facie case, it was found in violation of Title VII. 0
In order to fashion a remedy for the class, the district court sought to
determine why the company's practices led to the hiring of a dispropor-
tionate number of blacks into the stemmery.71 The court found that the
disparity was not due to the black applicants being less skilled than the
white applicants.7 2 It also found no evidence that blacks preferred the
seasonal work. 73 The court noted the fact that Philip Morris had, by its own
admission, intentionally discriminated against blacks in the past.7 4 The
district court concluded that blacks applying for jobs believed the com-
pany still discriminated and thus applied for and accepted stemmery work
because they felt this department was most likely to hire them.75
To stop the disproportionate hiring of blacks into the stemmery, the
district court ordered the company to advise all job applicants of the
positions currently available in all departments and to inform all appli-
cants that the company would assign all new workers to departments with-
out regard to race .7 The court stated this this would lead to more blacks
applying for and receiving jobs in the three permanent departments.
77
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the com-
pany had not violated Title VII.78 The court reasoned that the trial court's
finding of discrimination was based on one of two grounds.79 Either the
company had failed to reassert a balance in its work force to make up for
past discrimination or the company had done nothing to dispel the belief
of job applicants that it still discriminated.80 The court found both grounds
invalid bases for the lower court's holding.
The Fourth Circuit held that Title VII does not require an employer to
balance its work force along racial lines s. 8 In fact, the Act forbids preferen-
tial treatment of any group solely to achieve a balance.2 With regard to
the claim that the company had done nothing to dispel its reputation as a
discriminatory employer, the court decided Title VII does not require a
company to announce its nondiscriminatory practices. 3 The court also
11 419 F. Supp. at 353; see text accompanying note 89 infra.
1* 419 F. Supp. at 356; see text accompanying note 89 infra.
71 419 F. Supp. at 355-56.
72 Id.
73Id.
74 Id. Up until 1961, the company maintained segregated departments, the stemmery
being all black. Id. at 354.
73 Id. at 356.
78 Id. at 357.
SId.
T' Lewis v. Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union, 557 F.2d 1135, 1138 (4th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 1141.
' Id.
'" Id.
' See note 15 supra.
577 F.2d at 1143. The Code of Federal Regulations requires that employers post notices
informing their employees and potential employees that discrimination is prohibited. 29
C.F.R. § 1601.27 (1977). The EEOC has taken the position that an employer has the further
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found that there was no substantial evidence that job applicants believed
the company still discriminated and, therefore, reversed this finding of fact
of the district court as clearly erroneous."
In reversing the district court's finding that Philip Morris had violated
Title VII, the Fourth Circuit did not follow the theory of discrimination
advanced by the district court. Discrimination in employment can result
from either disparate treatment by an employer or from the disparate
impact of a neutral selection procedure used by the employer., Disparate
treatment occurs when an employer is intentionally discriminating against
a certain group protected by Title VI.1 A violation of Title VII can occur,
however, if the employer uses a facially neutral procedure that tends to
select one group over another." This is the disparate impact theory.8
The disparate impact type violation of Title VII is based on the Su-
preme Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 9 Under Griggs, the
duty to take affirmative steps to dispel a reputation in the community that it discriminates.
EEOC Dec. 74-41, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. 456 (October 1973). This view has some support in the
courts, although no court has found a violation of Title VII solely because an employer has
not dispelled his reputation for discrimination. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers'
Int'l Ass'n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123, 137-40 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 7 Empl. Prac. Dec. § 9066 (W.D. Okla. 1973); LARSON, supra note 5, at § 82.20.
When a violation of Title VII is found to exist, the court can order the employer to take steps
to dispel the discriminatory reputation as part of the remedy granted. United States v.
Georgia Power Co., 274 F.2d 906, 926 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974),
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398,418 n.19 (5th Cir. 1974); rev'd on other grounds,
424 U.S. 747 (1975).
577 F.2d at 1143.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355-36 n.15 (1977); see EEOC
COWPL. MAN. (BNA) §§ 131-35 (1975).
" See EEOC Comn. MAN. (BNA) § 131 (1975).
" International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971); Note, Proving Discriminatory Intent from
a Facially Neutral Decision with a Disproportionate Impact, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 109;
see note 89 infra.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971); see note 89 infra.
" 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs involved general intelligence and mechanical aptitude tests
given to job applicants by the defendant employer, and challenged as discriminatory. Id. at
427-28. The Supreme Court held that an intent to discriminate is not necessary under Title
VII. Id. at 432. An employer who uses a device in the hiring or promotion of employees that
is neutral on its face nonetheless violates Title VII if the device is found to have a discrimina-
tory impact. Id. at 430. To present a prima facie case of discrimination under Griggs, the
plaintiff must show that the device in question has a disproportionate impact on one group.
Id.; see LARSON, supra note 5, at § 50.31. For example, if applicants for a job are given an
aptitude test which is failed by 40% of the blacks who take it and 20% of the whites, assuming
the difference to be statistically significant, the test has been shown to have a dispropor-
tionate impact on blacks. See LARSON, supra note 5, at § 50.31. This is true even though the
employer has no intent to discriminate and the test was designed to be fair and neutral. Id.
Once the plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discriminatory impact, the burden shifts
to the defendant to show that he has a business necessity for using the device in question.
401 U.S. at 431. The test of business necessity is whether the device has an "overriding
legitimate business purpose." Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The device must be necessary for the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Id. There must be no alternative device that would serve the
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plaintiff can make out a prima facie case of discrimination by proving the
procedure under question has a discriminatory impact. 0 The defendant
can refute this by showing a business necessity for the procedure.? Apply-
ing the Griggs rationale, the district court in Lewis found that the hiring
practices of the company had a disproportionate impact on blacks since a
greater percentage of black job applicants obtained stemmery jobs than
did white applicants." Philip Morris did not prove a business necessity for
its hiring methods. 93 The district court then went on to examine why the
disparate impact occurred, and found that this was due to the company's
reputation for discrimination among black job applicants. 4 Philip Morris
was thus ordered to tell applicants that it did not discriminate in order to
remedy the flaw in the hiring procedure and thereby end the disparate
impact.95
The Fourth Circuit in its opinion did not indicate that the district court
had approached the case under the disparate impact theory. The appellate
court emphasized the fact that the lower court found the defendant had
no motive to discriminate,9" which is necessary for a finding of disparate
treatment, but irrelevant in the disparate impact context. 7 The Fourth
Circuit correctly held that the failure of the company to announce that it
did not discriminate is not a violation of Title VII,1 but the district court
business better or serve the business as well and with a lesser racial impact. Id.
The Griggs rationale was first applied to objective tests. See text accompanying notes
103-17 infra. The disparate impact theory, however, has been applied to other devices as well.
See LARSON, supra note 5, at § 76.6. In Pennington v. Lexington School Dist. 2, 578 F.2d 546
(4th Cir. 1978), the device in question was a maternity leave policy. School board policy
guaranteed that a teacher on maternity leave would be reinstated at the start of the next
school year in a position of comparable status and pay. Id. at 547. By comparison, teachers
absent for other reasons for over twenty consecutive days were not guaranteed reinstatement.
Id. at 548. The court found, however, that these teachers were generally reinstated as soon
as they were able to work and did not have to wait until the next year, putting them in a
better position than those teachers on maternity leave. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that the
maternity policy had a disparate impact on women, and remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the policy was mandated by business necessity. Id.
In Pennington, the Fourth Circuit applied Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977), which involved a similar maternity policy. In Nashville Gas, employees returning to
work from maternity leave did not have their acumulated seniority counted when they ap-
plied for reinstatement. Id. at 139-40. Employees absent because of disease or disability had
their seniority considered when the reapplied for a job. Id. at 140. The Supreme Court found
that the policy, while neutral on its face, was discriminatory in its impact since it imposed a
substantial burden on women that men did not suffer. Id. at 142. Therefore, the policy could
survive only if it were based on business necessity. Id. at 143.
10 See note 89 supra.
91 Id.
Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 353 (E.D. Va. 1976).
" Id. at 354. The district court does not indicate whether Philip Morris made any at-
tempt to prove business necessity.
11 Id. at 354-56; see text accompanying notes 71-77 supra.
Is Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 357 (E.D. Va. 1976); see text accompa-
nying notes 76-77 sujra.
" 577 F.2d at 1141.
See note 89 supra.
577 F.2d at 1141-42; see note 83 supra.
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had not said this was a violation.9 Instead, after the district court had
found a violation of Title VII by the company, it imposed the duty to
announce that it did not discriminate as a remedy.' °0
Even if the Fourth Circuit had followed the district court and treated
the case under the disparate impact theory, the case still may not have
been affirmed. The Fourth Circuit did not rule on whether, as a matter of
law, the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of disparate impact. If
the Fourth Circuit had found a prima facie case, the reversal of the district
court's finding of the fact that the company had a discriminatory reputa-
tion must still be dealt with.'"' The district court considered the discrimi-
natory reputation of the company in fashioning a remedy, once it found
that the company had discriminated. °2 Since the finding that the company
had a discriminatory reputation was overturned by the Fourth Circuit, the
district court's remedy cannot stand. Thus, if the Fourth Circuit had
agreed that Philip Morris had violated Title VII, the case should neverthe-
less have been remanded because of the erroneous finding of fact by the
district court.
Attorneys' Fees Under Title VII
The third major case in the employment discrimination field to be
decided recently by the Fourth Circuit is Walston v. School Board of
Suffolk,"°3 a disparate impact case. 04 At issue was the use of the standard-
See Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 345, 356-57 (E.D. Va. 1976).
'® Id.; see note 83 supra.
10, See text accompanying notes 94 & 95 supra.
102 419 F. Supp. at 356-57; see text accompanying notes 94 & 95 supra.
103 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977).
104 See text accompanying note 85-91 supra. Walston was brought under the fourteenth
amendment rather than Title VII. See text accompanying note 2 supra. The court, however,
used a disparate impact analysis (see note 89 supra) and the opinion thus reads as a Title
VII case.
Courts have been willing to apply legal theories developed in Title VII cases to non-Title
VII employment discrimination actions. In Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, 575 F.2d 471 (4th
Cir. 1978), the plaintiffs argued that a seniority system valid under Title VII could nonethe-
less be found to be discriminatory under the fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976), which guarantees all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States equal protec-
tion of the law. Id. at 473. The Fourth Circuit held that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), the
principles of Title VII are applicable to a case brought under § 1981. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)
reads in part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by
the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title
"CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with
the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same
into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against
law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of
the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is
held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
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ized National Teachers Examination (NTE) °5 as a criterion of employ-
ment. A teacher was required to achieve a minimum score of 500 on the
test in order to be hired or retained in the Suffolk school system.' 6 In an
earlier decision in the lawsuit,' the Fourth Circuit had found the use of
the test discriminatory since blacks were shown to score lower than
whites.' 8 The court, therefore, had held that the NTE could not be used
unless proper validation studies were made indicating that the test was job
related,1'0 and remanded the case to the district court with directions to
disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of
punishment on the party found guilty.
The court concluded that the disparate impact theory of discrimination, see text accom-
panying note 89 supra, could be applied in a § 1981 suit, but since the defendant's seniority
system was valid under Title VII, it could not be found discriminatory under § 1981. 575 F.2d
at 474-75.
'0 The National Teachers Examination (NTE) is given by the Educational Testing
Service of Princeton, New Jersey. Walston v. County School Ed. of Nansemond County, 492
F.2d 919, 921 (4th Cir. 1974). Normally given to college seniors and recent graduates, the test
has two parts. Id. The Weighted Common section, at issue in Walston, is designed to measure
a teacher's basic professional preparation and general academic attainment. Id. A second
section measures a teacher's knowledge in specific subject areas. Id. The use of ability tests
is specifically allowed under Title VII which states, in part, that it is not "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally
developed ability test provided that such test ... is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1976).
106 Walston v. County School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919, 921 (4th Cir.
1974).
"I The first case was Walston v. County School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919
(4th Cir. 1974). Nansemond County has been merged into the City of Suffolk, which has
assumed its obligations. 566 F.2d at 1203.
' Walston v. County School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919, 922, 927 (4th Cir.
1974). By showing that blacks score lower than whites on the NTE, the plaintiffs established
that the tests had a disparate impact on blacks. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971); text accompanying note 89 supra.
log Walston v. County School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919, 924-27 (4th Cir.
1974). The EEOC has issued guidelines on the procedures to be used in the validation of
employment tests to show that they are job related. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1977). While
these guidelines are not regulations with the force of law, they are given great deference by
the courts. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). The EEOC adopted the
standards accepted by the American Psychological Association. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1977).
The preferred method is to show criterion-related validity, although content and construct
validity can also be tested. See generally" LAmON, supra note 5 at §§ 77.00-.50. Criteron
validity compares an individual's score on a test to his actual performance on the job. Id. at
§§ 77.20-22. Content validity means that the test being used measures the ability to perform
skills that will be needed on the job in question. Id. at § 77.30. Construct validity is similar
to content validity, but rather than measuring specific skills, it measures general traits that
are needed for the job. Id. at § 77.40-.50. As an example, suppose a test is given to a potential
typist. If it can be shown that people with the best scores on the test make the best typists,
the test has criterion validity. If ii is shown that the test measures speed and accuracy in
typing and that these skills are needed for the job then the test has content validity. Id. at §
77.30. If, instead, it is shown that a typist needs concentration, perserverence, and an atten-
tion to detail and the test measures these traits, it has construct validity. Id. at § 77.50. For
an actual validation of the NTE, see note 112 infra.
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issue the proper injunction."10 On remand, the district court entered an
injunction ordering that "the defendants [be] . . .enjoined from making
use of the National Teachers Examination as a sole basis for employ-
ment.""' The injunction was vacated by the Fourth Circuit in the instant
case on the ground that it did not comply with the directive in the first
case requiring that the test could not be used at all without proper valida-
tion."' The court again remanded the case to the district court and ordered
a new injunction to comply with this directive."
3
The second Walston decision complies with the reasoning of Griggs."4
The plaintiffs showed that the test had a disproportionate impact on
blacks, even though the test was facially neutral."5 Once this was done,
the school board had to show that the test could be used by proving that
it was a reasonable measure of job performance. 6 The school board was
enjoined from using the test until it could demorstrate through validation
studies that the NTE is related to job performance." 7
In Walston, the Fourth Circuit also set guidelines for the district courts
to follow when awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in Title VII
cases."" Plaintiffs' counsel in Walston had billed for a- total of 984.25
,, Walson v. County School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919, 927 (4th Cir. 1974).
' Walston v. School Bd. of Suffolk, 418 F. Supp. 639, 643 (E.D. Va. 1976).
,,Z 566 F.2d at 1204. The NTE can be validated, as is shown by United States v. South
Carolina Educ. Ass'n, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. 1196 (D.S.C. April 14, 1977). The defendant
validated the test by assembling a panel of educators from the 25 teacher training institutions
in South Carolina. Id. at 1213. These educators established the content validity, see note 109
supra, of the NTE by showing that each question on the test involved subject matter that
was part of the curriculum at the training institution. Id. The panel also established the
minimum score for the test by estimating the percentage of minimally qualified students at
the institutions who would know the correct answers. Id. The defendants thus showed that
the NTE evaluated what a minimally qualified teacher, trained in South Carolina, would
know.
"3 556 F.2d at 1204.
"' See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); text accompanying note 89 supra.
"s Walston v. School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1974); see
text accompanying note 89 supra.
"I Walston v. School Bd. of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919, 924 (4th Cir. 1974); see
text accompanying note 89 supra.
" 566 F.2d at 1204.
Id. at 1204-05, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United
States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
The award of fees in Walston was based on 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976), which is a similar
provision dealing with attorney's fees in discrimination suits involving elementary and sec-
ondary education. The Attorney's Fee Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), makes the same
provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party at the court's discretion in suits
brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1983 (1976). While the attorney's fee statutes call for fees
to be awarded to the prevailing party, courts have not followed the same guidelines in award-
ing fees to prevailing defendants as they have in awarding fees to plaintiffs. See Heinsz,
Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Title VIlDefendants: Towards a Workable Standard. 8 U. TOL.
L. REv. 259, 296 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Heinsz]. When the plaintiff prevails, the Su-
[Vol. XXXVI
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
hours." 9 The district court, basing its award on a percentage of the total
recovery, awarded the plaintiffs' attorneys $10,407.40.121 In reversing the
district court's award, the Fourth Circuit held that an award of attorney's
fees is not to be based solely on the amount of monetary recovery.' The
Fourth Circuit adopted as guidelines the factors set out in Disciplinary
Rule 2-106(b) of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, used by attorneys to determine their own fees.' In Walston,
the court considered the relevant factors to be time spent and labor ex-
pended, the customary fee in the locality, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved and the skill required to present them properly, the
amount of money involved, and the results obtained.ln
In adopting the ABA standards for determining attorney's fees, the
Fourth Circuit aligned itself with several other circuits.2 4 Judge Widener,
however, dissented.1 21 While not objecting to the use of the ABA standards
in general, he did not think that the district court's award in Walston was
so unreasonable as to merit reversal.
12
Although not stressed by the dissent, both the awarding and amount
of attorney's fees in employment discrimination cases is to be left to the
discretion of the trial judge. 1' Thus, an award of fees by the trial court
should be overturned only if the court has clearly abused its discretion.'2
The Fourth Circuit did not indicate that the trial court abused its discre-
tion, and, therefore, the district court's award of attorney's fees should
have been affirmed. Thus, the dissent takes the better view that while an
preme Court has held that an award of attorney's fees should be made unless special circum-
stances are present. Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-17 (1978). When
the defendant prevails, courts have held that an award should be made only if special circum-
stances are present. Heinsz, supra at 296. See also 434 U.S. at 417-22.
"1 566 F.2d at 1204.
120 Id.
121 Id.
'2 The factors listed by the ABA to be used in determining an attorney's fee are: (1) The
time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the
lawyer; (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) The
amount involved and the results obtained; (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or
the circumstances; (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility D.R. 2-
106(b) (1977); see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974).
"2 566 F.2d at 1205; see note 122 supra.
121 566 F.2d at 1204; see Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717
(5th Cir. 1974); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
22 566 F.2d at 1206-07 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
' Id. at 1207.
' See note 118 supra.
"2 Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 467 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1972); see Lea v.
Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971).
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appellate court can provide guidelines to the lower courts, Walston was not
the proper case in which to impose these guidelines.'
The Supreme Court recently held that attorney's fees must be awarded
to plaintiffs in Title VII cases, unless special circumstances are present.3 0
This result previously had been reached by the Fourth Circuit. 3 ' Walston
further limits the discretion of the trial courts in awarding attorney's fees
since they now must follow the ABA guidelines.' The Fourth Circuit has
indicated that it places great weight on the awarding of attorney's fees as
an encouragement to the private enforcement of employment discrimina-
tion cases.1x3 Therefore, the court will not hesitate to review the action of
a district court in this matter.
These recent Fourth Circuit decisions in the employment discrimina-
tion field have made it easier for plaintiffs to bring suit, while at the same
time narrowing the area of potential liability for employers. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission will not be bound by laches in
bringing enforcement actions.3 Private plaintiffs will be encouraged to
bring suits because of the increased likelihood that they will receive attor-
ney's fees.' At the same time, an employer will not be in violation of Title
VII solely because he has failed to balance his work force or inform job
applicants that he does not discriminate. 3 1 In sum, almost fifteen years
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, many facets of employment
discrimination law are still being defined by the courts.
EDwARD K. STEIN
Age Discrimination Prohibited in Municipal Employment
In Arritt v. Grisell' the Fourth Circuit subjected municipal police hiring
practices to congressional anti-discrimination policy. The Fourth Circuit
rejected the argument that the tenth amendment bars congressional inter-
'" 566 F.2d at 1206 (Widener, J., concurring and dissenting).
3 Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416-417 (1978); see note 118 supra.
"I Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); see Heinsz, supra note 118,
at 263-65.
32 See text accompanying note 122 supra.
3 See text accompanying note 130-131 supra. Although Walston applied Title VII analy-
sis, see text accompanying note 104 supra, the language of other statutory provisions allowing
the award of attorney's fees is similar to the language of the statute involved in Walston. See
note 118 supra. Presumably, then, the Fourth Circuit will order the district court to use the
ABA guidelines when applying these provisions as well.
'3 See text accompanying notes 20-59 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 118-33 supra.
'' See text accompanying notes 60-102 supra.
567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). Grisell was one of three members of the Police Civil
Service Commission of Moundsville, West Virginia named as defendants. The city of
Moundsville was also named as a defendant. Id. at 1269.
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ference in state and city governmental functions2 and held that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)l is applicable to the states as
a function of congressional power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.4
The Fourth Circuit also specified the standard to be used in testing age
qualifications against the provisions of ADEA.
5
Plaintiff Arritt, a 40 year old male, challenged a West Virginia statute
declaring anyone over 35 ineligible to take preparatory examinations for
police training.6 Arritt contended that the West Virginia statute violated
ADEA and the fourteenth amendment.7 The defendant, Moundsville,
West Virginia, denied that Congress could constitutionally infringe its
police hiring regulations' and denied that its age qualification contravened
the provisions of ADEA
Moundsville argued that the Supreme Court in National League of
Cities v. Usury" prohibited congressional intrusions on state police em-
ployment practices under the commerce clause." National League of Cities
concerned 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
subjecting states and their political subdivisions to minimum wage provi-
sions Congress had previously established for private employers." Mini-
mum wage standards curtailed state police hiring and training programs,
and the National League of Cities decision held that the tenth amend-
2 567 F.2d at 1270; see text accompanying notes 10-18 infra.
3The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)
prohibits the refusal to hire an individual between 40 and 65 because of age. Id. § 630(b)(2).
567 F.2d at 1271; see text accompanying notes 19-20 infra.
567 F.2d at 1271-72; see text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
Id. at 1269. Under West Virginia law, "[n]o application for original appointment (in
the police civil service) shall be received if the individual applying is less than eighteen years
of age or more than thirty-five years of age .. "WEST VA. CODE § 8-14-12 (Michie, 1976
Repl. Vol.).
7 567 F.2d at 1269.
a Id. The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying to any person within their
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. The fourteenth
amendment is a limitation of state, as opposed to federal, action. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1879). The principal purpose of the equal protection clause was to prohibit racial
discrimination, but it has since been expanded to cover discrimination against sex, religious
preference and national heritage. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 76 (1917). See also notes
29 & 30 infra.
567 F.2d at 1269; see note 1 supra.
1 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
" The commerce clause permits Congress to "regulate commerce ... among the several
states. . ."U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3. Congress may regulate intrastate commerce provided
that it might "affect" interstate commerce. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975)
(reaffirmed in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976)); see Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255 (1964) (discussing breadth of congres-
sional power under commerce clause). Congress may regulate labor and private employment
through the commerce clause if an effect on interstate commerce is apparent. United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
' 426 U.S. 833, 835 (1976); see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §
213(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 2, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 55
(1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 59.
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ment'3 limits congressional authority to use the commerce clause to intrude
on such integral state functions." The ADEA age discrimination and FLSA
wage and hour provisions extended to state employment under the same
1974 Fair Labor Standards Act amendments.'" The ADEA, like FLSA,
curtailed state discretion in police hiring.'" In addition, the ADEA and
FLSA were originally enacted under congressional power to regulate labor
through the commerce clause, with similar statutory language.' 7 Conse-
quently, the National League of Cities decision called into question the
continued applicability of ADEA to the states.'8
13 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). The tenth amendment states that "powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states. . . "U.S. CONST. amend. X. The tenth amendment protects state sovereignty against
national encroachment much as the first nine amendments protect individual rights against
national power. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 553 (1975) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). See
also Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seesaw: Balancing National League of Cities,
11 GA. L. REv. 35, 48 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Beaird & Ellington]. The tenth amendment
appeared moribund after United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), when the Supreme
Court declared the tenth amendment to be "but a truism." Id. at 124; see Percy, National
League of Cities v. Usery: the Tenth Amendment is Alive and Well, 51 TuL. L. Rav. 95, 96
(1976). [hereinafter cited as Percy]. In National League of Cities the Supreme Court used
the tenth amendment as a limitation on the reach of congressional power under the commerce
clause for the first time in four decades. Id.; see, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936) (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act barred by tenth amendment). See generally Bar-
ber, National League of Cities v. Usery, New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment, 1976 Sup.
CT. REv. 161, 161 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Barber]; see also Note, Constitutionality of
ADEA After Usery, 30 ARK. L. REv. 363, 365 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ADEA After Usery].
"1 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976). The Supreme Court
warned that "[i]f Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those
fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of these func-
tions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States' 'separate and independent
existence."' Id., citing Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559,580 (1911) (Congress may not impose
conditions depriving a state of its dignity and power).
' Compare Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) as
amended by Pub. L. 93-259, § 28, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 55 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 78 (states included under ADEA as regulated employers) with 29
U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(c) as amended by Pub. L. 83-259 § 6, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 55 (1974)
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 59 (states included under FLSA as regu-
lated employers).
, See ADEA after Usery, supra note 13, at 365.
" Compare 29 U.S.C. § 621(4) (1976) (age restrictions affect commerce), with 29 U.S.C.
§ 202(a) (1976) (wage rates affect commerce). See also Usery v. Manchester East Catholic
Regional School Bd., 430 F. Supp. 188, 189 (D.N.H. 1977) (scope of term "affecting com-
merce" in ADEA coextensive with congressional powers under commerce clause); Usery v.
Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Utah 1976) (ADEA a valid exercise of commerce
power).
"1 See ADEA After Usery, supra note 13, at 364. The lower court avoided deciding
whether National League of Cities removed state employment from the province of ADEA
by finding West Virginia's age limitation did not violate ADEA. Arritt v. Grisell, 421 F. Supp.
800, 802 (N.D. W.Va. 1976), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). The district court thus
avoided an unnecessary conflict between state and federal power. Id. at 802 n.2, citing Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (federal
courts should avoid constitutional issues if statutory construction resolves the controvery).
Since the Fourth Circuit subjected West Virginia's age limitation to a stricter standard than
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The Fourth Circuit decided, however, that the tenth amendment only
limits congressional authority under the commerce clause and the
National League of Cities does not circumscribe legislation under the four-
teenth amendment." The Fourth Circuit noted similarities between ADEA
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 which the Supreme Court
held applicable to the states as an exercise of congressional power under
the fourteenth amendment.2' The Fourth Circuit also cited its previous
determination that the Equal Pay Act, prohibiting sex discrimination in
salaries, is enforceable against the states under the fourteenth amend-
mentn even though the Equal Pay Act was originally enacted under the
commerce clause and made binding on the states by the 1974 amendments
challenged in National League of Cities.Y The Fourth Circuit concluded
that ADEA is antidiscrimination legislation supported by the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the tenth amendment
does not prevent Congress from prohibiting state discrimination against
workers on the basis of age.
24
The Fourth Circuit's holding that ADEA is not subject to tenth amend-
ment limitations on congressional authority may be problematic, since the
did the district court, the Fourth Circuit anticipated a conflict between West Virginia law
and the congressional legislation. 567 F.2d at 1272.
" 567 F.2d at 1271. Congress has power to enforce the fourteenth amendment against
the states with appropriate legislation. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655 (1965); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 5. The Fourth Circuit cited Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976)
in support of the proposition that Congress has greater reach under the fourteenth amend-
ment than through the commerce clause since unlike the commerce clause the fourteenth
amendment is not limited by tenth amendment protection of state sovereignty. 567 F.2d at
1271. But see Note, At Federalism's Crossroads: National League of Cities v. Usery, 57 B. U.
L. REv. 178, 185 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Federalism's Crossroads]: if this distinction
prevails, "courts must always strain to determine whether a statute, invalid under the com-
merce clause, can be shoehorned into the more potent fourteenth amendment." Id. at 191.
See also Justice Harlan's dissent in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966), conclud-
ing that giving Congress the power to impose its interpretation of the fourteenth amendment
on the states would allow it to "swallow the States" and "sacrifice fundamentals in the
American Constitutional system in the boundaries between federal and state authority." Id.
at 671.
" 567 F.2d at 1270-71. The Fourth Circuit examined legislative history of the ADEA and
concluded that the prohibition of age discrimination was similar to antidiscrimination provi-
sions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2000e-17 (1976). 567 F.2d
at 1270 n.11. But see note 25 infra.
21 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976).
" Usery v. Charleston County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1171 (4th Cir. 1977). The
Fourth Circuit held in Charleston County that its duty in passing on the constitutionality of
legislation is to determine whether Congress had the authority to adopt the legislation, "not
whether it correctly guessed the source of that power." Id. The Fourth Circuit would not
frustrate cdngressional policy against sex discrimination "simply because the legislative his-
tory does not contain the magic words, 'Fourteenth Amendment'." Id.; see Fourth Circuit
Review, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 462, 464-68 (1978). But see note 19 supra.
3 558 F.2d at 1170; see Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970), as amended
Pub. L. 93-259 § 6, 93rd Cong. 2d Sess. 55, (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 59 (1974).
24 567 F.2d at 1271.
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analogy to the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
seems incomplete.25 Title VII and the Equal Pay Act address forms of
discrimination already cognizable under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment." Age qualifications do not contravene the equal
protection clause.? The Fourth Circuit, following the Supreme Court's
equal protection clause analysis in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia,2 8 conceded that age qualifications do not create a suspect classifi-
cation2 19 and that police employment is not a fundament right. " Accord-
See Federalism's Crossroads, supra note 19 at 185. Title VII and ADEA are similar
enough that courts sometimes use interpretations of Title VII for assistance in defining
sections of ADEA. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 1976). However, an
important difference between age discrimination and Title VII discrimination is that age
restrictions usually address economic or safety concerns, while Title VII counters the social
problems of racial prejudice and intolerance. See Note, The Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 90 HARv. L. REv. 380, 389 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Age Discrimination].
The extreme sensitivity courts display when confronted with a race restriction is inappro-
priate for an age qualification, since age qualifications often are justifiable. See Laugesen v.
Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (age discrimination should not automatically
be treated like race discrimination); Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299,
1306 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (age requirements given less careful scrutiny than bars to employment
based on race or sex). In interpreting this aspect of the Arritt decision, courts should be wary
of applying to age regulations the rigorous fourteenth amendment standards developed for
social problems like racial prejudice.
26 The Equal Pay Act is directed toward sex discrimination in hiring. See notes 22 & 23
supra. The Supreme Court has recognized that gender-based classifications may violate the
fourteenth amendment. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682, 688 (1973) (employ-
ment benefit classification having a disproportionate effect on female employees violates
equal protection clause). Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 77, 78 (1971) (statute preferring male estate
administrators over female administrators denies equal protection). Title VII is directed
against racial classifications which violate the equal protection clause. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (Title VII enacted to enforce the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment). Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Continental Air Lines, 372
U.S. 714, 721 (1963) (racial bars to employment violate equal protection clause).
" 567 F.2d at 1271-72; see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia. 427 U.S. 307, 318
(1976).
567 F.2d at 1271-72.
567 F.2d at 1272. A suspect classification is legislation directed against a minority
traditionally "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment or relegated to such a position of powerlessness as to command extraordi-
nary protection from the majoritarian political process." Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). Age is not a suspect classification receiving strict scrutiny
by the courts. Id. Compare Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (unequal
distribution of wealth alone does not trigger suspect classification under equal protection
clause) with Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (alienage a suspect class);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race a suspect class); Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (ancestry a suspect class).
11 567 F.2d at 1272. A fundamental right is one the courts determine to be implicit in
the basic liberty the Constitution is meant to protect. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
The Supreme Court has held that there is no fundamental right to state employment.
Compare Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) with Bullock
v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to vote fundamental); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
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ingly the Fourth Circuit recognized that under traditional equal protection
clause analysis West Virginia's statute was rationally related to securing
public safety and did not contravene the fourteenth amendment.'
The Fourth Circuit noted, nonetheless, that state practices which
"would pass muster" in the courts under the fourteenth amendment may,
be prohibited by congressional legislation enforcing the fourteenth amend-
ment. " The Fourth Circuit cited Supreme Court decisions to the effect
that courts are limited to invalidating state statutes which are applied in
bad faith or enacted with discriminatory intent.3 Congress enjoys broader
capacity than the courts to enforce the fourteenth amendment since Con-
gress may supercede state laws regardless of the state's intent to reach the
law's discriminatory effects. Since age classifications are not in them-
selves unconstitutional,3 the Fourth Circuit's analysis implies that ADEA
is legislation countering discriminatory effects neither intended by state
age qualifications nor apparent on their face. The discriminatory effect of
West Virginia's hiring restriction is difficult to ascertain, however, since
everyone ages at the same rate. 6 Accordingly it is doubtful that Congress
would have reason to supercede Moundsville's age restriction, since age
restrictions do not discriminate against particular minorities.
Although Arritt presents a perplexing problem of constitutional analy-
sis," the decision has been cited with approval in another circuit as the
618 (1969) (right of interstate travel fundamental); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate fundamental).
3' 567 F.2d at 1272. By traditional equal protection analysis, if a statute does not involve
a suspect classification, see note 29 supra, or abridge a fundamental right, see note 30 supra,
the statute need only be demonstrably rational to be held constitutional. Massachusetts Bd.
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,312-13 (1976), citing San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973) (traditional equal protection test reaffirmed).
West Virginia's age qualification is rationally related to assuring the physical preparedness
of its police, and the Fourth Circuit held that the qualification accordingly did not contravene
the fourteenth amendment. 567 F.2d at 1272.
32 567 F.2d at 1272. Congress "shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the
provisions of this article" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. The Supreme Court in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), confirmed congressional authority, independent of the judici-
ary, to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment against the states. Id. at 658. But
see note 21 supra.
13 567 F.2d at 1272. Compare Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977) (disproportionate impact of zoning not unconstitutional
absent showing of invidious purpose) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)
(courts may take into account discriminatory impact, but discriminatory intent is control-
ling) with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (Congress may reach dispropor-
tionate impact of employment test regardless of discriminatory intent).
31 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966); see notes 19 & 32-33 supra.
11 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318 (1976); see text accom-
panying notes 28-31 supra.
u In Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976) the Court took judicial notice
that regardless of individual differences, the aging process "proceeds inexorably and takes
its toll along the way." Id. at 462; accord Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp.
1299, 1306 (E.D. Mich. 1976), see Age Discrimination, supra note 25 at 383.
1 An alternative approach might be that Congress enacted ADEA to counter blanket age
limitations as irrebuttable presumptions denying due process under the fourteenth amend-
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first instance of a circuit court holding that states must observe ADEA in
the aftermath of National League of Cities." The Arritt decision also
breaks new ground in determining the proper standard for testing age
qualifications against the provisions of ADEA.5
Since age can be related to capability in some jobs, Congress allows
employers to justify an age qualification as an exception to ADEA if it
meets the test for a bona fide occupation qualification (bfoq).40 Congress
left to the courts the question of what qualifications meet the bfoq excep-
tion." In Arritt the lower court followed Hodgsen v. Greyhound Lines,42 a
Seventh Circuit decision which held that when a job affects public safety
and when eliminating the hiring practice would create "a minimum in-
crease in the risk of harm," an age restriction may be sustained as a bfoq.13
Moundsville submitted an affidavit describing the rigors of police work
ment, which prohibits deprivation of "life, liberty or property without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1. The constraints of National League and the tenth amendment
are avoided by use of the due process clause since the tenth amendment does not limit
congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. See notes 13 & 19 supra. Likewise,
Murgia held that age classifications are permissable under the equal protection clause with-
out addressing due process. See notes 26-31 supra. For ADEA to be supported by the due
process clause, Congress would have had to treat employment as an incident of liberty, the
freedom to "engage in any of the common occupations of life." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923). West Virginia's statutory premise that anyone over 35 is incapable of police
work then would be a codified irrebuttable presumption, which is prohibited by the due
process clause. United States Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (irrebuttable
presumption denying rational measure of need for public assistance violates due process);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973) (denial of resident tuition rates to university
student unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
(1972) (statute assuming single father incapable of raising children properly is impermissable
presumption). But cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1974) (Powell,
J., concurring) (irrebuttable presumption analysis should be sparingly used since legislation
invariably classifies and could almost always be termed an 'irrebuttable presumption'). See
also Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 449, 450-58
(1975). The drawback of giving Congress power to supercede any state law it defines as an
irrebuttable presumption is that each new definition striking down a state law would expand
congressional authority at the expense of state sovereignty. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 661 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603 (1975). See also note 19 supra.
"' Marshall v. Philadelphia, [1978] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (17 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas.) 869,
870 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See also Montgomery County, Md. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp. 1230, 1233
(D. Md. 1978) (Arritt cited for upholding ADEA under the fourteenth amendment). See text
accompanying notes 10-18 infra.
3 567 F.2d at 1271. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976) (bona fide occupational qualification
is an exception to ADEA's general proscription of age restrictions in hiring).
'0 567 F.2d at 1271.
"Id.; see LABOR DEPARTMENT INTERPRErivE BuLLETIN ON ADEA, 29 C.F.R § 860.102(b)
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Department of Labor Bulletin). The Department of Labor sug-
gests that as an exception to the general proscription of blanket age limitations in ADEA,
the bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) must be construed narrowly and given limited
application. Id. Justification for the bfoq is to be determined on "all the pertinent facts
surrounding each particular situation." Id.; see ADEA After Usery, note 13 supra, at 372 n.49.
42 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
567 F.2d at 1271. Hodgsen v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1974).
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and the necessity of physical prowess." The lower court denied Arritt's
motion to enter a counter-affidavit, holding that an increased risk in elimi-
nating the age restriction would be incontrovertible. Since Moundsville's
age requirement seemed reasonably related to providing a qualified police
force, the lower court granted summary judgment for Moundsville."
The Fourth Circuit agreed that facts in the record may have met the
lower court's test of a bfoq, but vacated the lower court's judgment, choos-
ing not to follow the Hodgsen "minimal increase" test." The Fourth Cir-
cuit adopted instead the standard developed by the Fifth Circuit in Usery
v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.4" Tamiami requires the employer to prove
that his age restriction is reasonably necessary to his business and to show
a factual basis for believing that all or most people excluded by the restric-
tion would be incapable of performing the job or could not be tested indi-
vidually.48 The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further development
of the facts under the Tamiami test of a bfoq.1"
The difference between the "minimal increase" test and the Tamiami
standard is substantial. Both tests put the burden of justifying an age
restriction on an employer, yet the "minimum increase" test would rarely
disturb state age qualifications in police hiring." Since police work directly
affects the public safety, abrogating even over-exclusive age qualifications
would affect police competence to some degree and increase the risk of
harm.' A police age screen would seldom fail the "minimum increase of
risk" test. The Tamiami standard, on the other hand, treats public safety
as only one of several factors used in evaluating whether the age restriction
is reasonable. 52 To meet the Tamiami standard, Moundsville must show
either that all or most people over 35 are incapable of police work or that
" Arritt v. Grisell, 421 F. Supp. 800, 802 (N.D. W. Va. 1976), reu'd, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th
Cir. 1977). Moundsville's affidavit, filed by the Chief of Police, recited job requirements
including fast driving, accurate shooting, quick reflexes, and physical prowess. Id. at 802-03.
The affidavit also stated that new recruits receive the most demanding assignments and that
the Chief of Police believed that skills necessary for police work decline with age. Id.
11 Id. at 803. At a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment the district court
declined to consider Arritt's counter affidavit since "the aging process . . . could not be
seriously questioned in the plaintiff's proferred affidavit." Id.
," 567 F.2d at 1271.
47 531 F.2d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 1976).
4 567 F.2d at 1271, citing Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 234 (5th
Cir. 1976). The Tamiami standard is a synthesis of two Fifth Circuit decisions, Diaz v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 387 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 404 U.S. 950 (1971) (requiring
a showing of reasonable necessity going to essence of business), and Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (requiring employer to prove all or most of the
restricted class could not perform the job in question or that indivi.dual testing is impractical).
" 567 F.2d at 1271.
See Age Discrimination, supra note 25 at 407.
5' Id.
52 The Fifth Circuit mentioned in Tamiami that it considered adopting the less stringent
Hodgson "minimal increase in risk of harm" approach to account for jobs affecting the public
safety, but decided instead that safety is adequately considered in the Diaz part of the two-
pronged test, since what is reasonable includes what is safe. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 1976); see note 48 supra.
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